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This article is a follow up on a previous article from the same authors. In that article the authors concluded that keeping the current
system for intra EU trade between businesses and addressing VAT fraud by using technological solutions may be the best way
forward. In this article the authors address potential technological solutions that can help to solve the issue of VAT fraud. The
technical solutions that are addressed are: split payment, blockchain technology, real time reporting and SAF-T. All these solutions
have or are being considered by some EU Member States or even the European Commission.
1 INTRODUCTION
In October 2017 the European Commission made its out-
lines for a definitive Value Added Tax (VAT) system for
intra-EU trade known, 1 followed by a detailed proposal of
these rules in May 2018.2 Under this proposal intra-EU
supplies will be subject to VAT in theMember State of arrival
of the goods. As a main rule the supplier has to pay this VAT
to the tax authorities. As a temporary relieve VAT can be
reverse charged to reliable taxable persons, so called
Certified Taxable Persons or CTPs.3 Before these proposals
were even accepted by EU Member States, the EU Member
States agreed on a temporary general reverse charge
mechanism.4 Under this system VAT fraud is addressed
because the supplier will no longer collect VAT from its
customer on domestic Business to Business (B2B) supplies
that it will need to remit to the tax authorities (and won’t in
case of VAT fraud). Both systems have been criticized in
literature.5 In our previous article we concluded that both
systems have benefits compared to the current system, but
also downsides as regards simplicity of the system and the
ease of audits. We also established that in both systems that
in order to make the system more fraud proof there will be
an increase of compliance burdens and administrative costs
for tax authorities.6 We therefore came to the conclusion
that keeping the current system and addressing VAT fraud
by using technological solutions may be the best way for-
ward. According to the OECD, depending on developments
in technology, automated systems may play a central role in
facilitating tax collection in the future. Currently, it sees
technology as a tool to support the operation of the existing
collection regimes.7 TheOECD encourages tax authorities to
allow the use of electronic record keeping systems as busi-
ness processes have become increasingly automated. Tax
authorities can make use of reliable business records and
accounting systems in order to acquire the information
needed (e.g. type, date and place of supply and VAT
payable).8 In this follow up on our previous article we will
address potential technological solutions that can help to
solve the issue of VAT fraud. After discussing the issue of
VAT fraud in section 2, we will discuss some important
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1 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards harmonising and simplifying certain rules in the value
added tax system and introducing the definitive system for the
taxation of trade between Member States, 4 Oct. 2017, COM
(2017) 569 final.
2 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC
as regards the introduction of the detailed technical measures for
the operation of the definitive VAT system for the taxation of trade
between Member States, 25 May 2018, COM (2018) 329 final.
3 For a more detailed review of the proposed system we refer to:
Madeleine Merkx, John Gruson, Naomie Verbaan & Bart van der
Doef, Definitive VAT Regime: Stairway to Heaven or Highway to Hell?
27(2) EC Tax Rev. 74–82 and M. Merkx & J. Gruson, Definitive
VAT Regime: Ready for the Next Step?, 28(3) EC Tax Rev. 136–149
(2019).
4 Council Directive (EU) 2018/2057 of 20 Dec. 2018 amending
Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax
as regards the temporary application of a generalized reverse charge
mechanism in relation to supplies of goods and services above a
certain threshold, OJ 2018, L 329/3.
5 Merkx, Gruson, Verbaan & van der Doef, supra n. 3, at 74–82 and
Gorka Echevarría Zubeldia, Definitive VAT Regime … Really?, 29(4)
Int’l VAT Monitor (2018) for the definitive VAT system and Petr
Toman, Reverse Charge in VAT – Possibilities and Limitations, in
Closing VAT GAP through Reverse Charge Mechanism 47–48
(Prague: Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, Dec. 2015),
Fabrizio Borselli, Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in the
European Union, Int’l VAT Monitor 341 (Sept./Oct. 2008) and
Robert F. van Brederode & Sebastion Pfeiffer, Combating Carousel
Fraud: The General Reverse Charge VAT, Int’l VAT Monitor 153–54
(May/June 2015) as regards the general reverse charge mechanism.
6 M Madeleine Merkx, Naomie Verbaan & Rianne Starkenburg, VAT
and International Trade’s Crossroads: Right, Left or Straight On, 28 (5)
EC Tax Rev. 233-244.
7 OECD, Mechanisms for the Effective Collection of VAT/GST When the
Supplier Is Not Located in the Jurisdiction of Taxation 17 & 27 (Paris:
OECD Publishing 2017a.).
8 OECD, 46–47 (2017a).
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technological solutions in sections 3–6. Technical solutions
can be implemented to prevent VAT fraud or detect this
fraud more easily and/or more quickly. We however stress
that when the risk of detection is higher this will also have a
preventive effect.9 The technical solutions that we will be
looking at are: split payment, blockchain technology, real
time reporting and Standard Audit File for Tax (SAF-T). All
these solutions have or are being considered by some EU
Member States or even the EuropeanCommission.We stress
that other technological solutions are also conceivable.10 In
particular we mention Transaction Network Analysis (TNA)
that has been promoted by the Dutch government.11 This is
a technological solution that detects fraud by analysing
transactions. However currently there is not enough infor-
mation available to duly analyse this instrument. We will
conclude the article with a conclusion in section 7.
2 THE ISSUE OF VAT FRAUD
VAT fraud is a big problem in the EU. With an estimated
VAT gap of EUR 152 billion a year within the EU, EUR 50
billion is ascribed to VAT fraud.12 The CJEU describes what
VAT fraud is in a number of cases.13 Technically VAT fraud
is no more than the non-payment of VAT where it should
have been paid. Important is that this is done with intent
(in other words in case VAT is not paid by accident or
because the taxable person does not have sufficient funds
we won’t speak of VAT fraud). The most persistent VAT
fraud is carousel fraud. VAT carousel fraud, also known as
Missing Trading Intra-Community Fraud or simply MTIC
fraud, in its simplest form requires three parties (A, B and
C) and most likely high value goods with a compact
volume or services. To conceal the VAT fraud from the
tax authorities often more parties are used in the fraud
supply chain, including innocent businesses. However,
irrespective of the length or complexity of the supply
chain the principle of the fraud is always the same.
In our example party A is established in Germany. It
supplies goods to B established in Greece. The goods are
transported from Germany to Greece in relation to this
supply. The supply therefore qualifies as in intra-
Community supply and is exempt from VAT. B is
required to report an intra-Community acquisition in
Greece. It can deduct this VAT in the same VAT return.
B subsequently sells the goods to party C established in
Greece. This is a local supply. Party B will charge Greek
VAT to party C. C will pay this VAT to B. Normally B
pays this VAT to the tax authorities and C deducts this
VAT in its local VAT return. In case of VAT fraud,
however, B does not report the intra-Community supply
and supply to C, but instead disappears with the VAT
that party C paid to him. To make it a carousel fraud
party C must supply the goods to party A so the fraud
can start again with the same goods.
The fraud is lucrative because of the exemption
applying in the A-B transaction followed by a local
supply that is subject to the general VAT rate.
3 SPLIT PAYMENT MECHANISM
The split payment mechanism is a VAT collecting system
that divides the payment for a supply of goods or ser-
vices into an amount excluding VAT (i.e. the net amount
or taxable base) and the VAT amount due. There are
Local supply 
Intra-Community 
supply 
A B 
C 
Intra-Community 
acquisition 
Germany
Greece
9 OECD, The Changing Tax Compliance Environment and the Role of
Audit, 245 (2017).
10 See e.g. Marta Papis-Almansa, The Polish Clearing House System a
‘Stir’ring Example of the Use of New Technologies in Ensuring VAT
Compliance in Poland and Selected Legal Challenges, 28 (1) EC Tax
Rev. 43–56 (2019)–1.
11 Letter of the State Secretary of Finance of 10 Nov. 2017, BZDOC-
1015490419-119, Fiche 5: Mededeling, richtlijn en verordening
betreffende een definitief BTW-systeem, 2, 5 and 7.
12 See Press release 28 Sept. 2017, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-3441_en.htm, and the full report Study and
Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States:2017 Final
Report, TAXUD/2015/CC/131.
13 For example in CJEU 7 Dec. 2010, C-285/09 (R.), ECLI:EU:
C:2010:742, para. 49.
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several versions of the split payment mechanism. One of
them, for example, is a model in which the purchaser
pays the net amount to the supplier’s business bank
account and the VAT amount to a blocked bank account,
which is used specifically for VAT purposes by the
supplier. This bank account can only be used for paying
VAT to either another taxable person’s blocked VAT
bank account or to the tax authorities.14 The customer
can make the two payments mentioned above. However,
it is also possible that the customer makes a single
payment, which subsequently will be split by the bank
into the taxable base paid to the supplier and the VAT
amount paid directly to the tax authorities.
Different types of split payment mechanisms are
already in place in a number of third countries and in
some Member States. For example, Italy has introduced a
split payment system as of 1 January 2015 for payments
to public authorities.15 In 2017 Italy obtained approval
of the Council of the European Union to derogate from
articles 206 and 226 of the VAT Directive to expand the
scope of the split payment mechanism to companies
controlled by central and local public authorities and to
companies listed to the stock exchange.16 The Polish
parliament approved a proposal to introduce a voluntary
split payment system for B2B transactions in October
2017. Under this system the customer will have to
include specific references in the payment instructions
given to its bank. Subsequently, the bank will split the
payment and only transfer the net amount to the suppli-
er’s general bank account. The VAT amount will be
transferred to a special blocked VAT account in the
name of the supplier. It may only be used for VAT
settlements with the tax authorities or to pay the VAT
on acquisition invoices to the VAT account of a
supplier.17 The Romanian government approved on 30
August 2017 the proposal for introducing a VAT split
payment mechanism. The new mechanism is mandatory
as from 1 January 2018 and also based on blocked VAT
accounts.18 In addition, the system is applicable to tax-
able persons and public institutions which have tax
debts above given thresholds or which are subject to
insolvency proceedings. End of November 2017,
Romania filed a request for derogation for the implemen-
tation of this VAT split payment mechanism. However,
Romania started applying the split payment mechanism
on 1 January 2018 without awaiting the Commission
reply to its request. On 8 November 2018, the
European Commission replied to the request. It takes
the view that certain elements of the Romanian split
payment model raise serious concerns regarding their
proportionality. It also states that the split payment
system puts an unjustifiable and disproportionate bur-
den on the customer. As a result, the Commission
objects to the request made by Romania.19
The European Commission has analysed the feasibility
of the split payment mechanism in 201020 and 2017.21
The 2010 study concluded that the split payment system is
an effective way to ensure the payment of VAT to the
Member State, as missing trader fraud would become
impossible.22 However, this study was limited in scope.
The 2017 study analysed a wide range of technical split
payment models and options. Results of the cost-benefit
analysis show that all options are expected to reduce the
VAT gap to some extent ranging from 27% to 56% reduc-
tion under the current regime. In addition, it was found
that the split payment mechanism would also considerably
reduce non-compliance due to new reporting requirements
and increased transparency. At the same time, the study
shows that implementations of the split payment mechan-
isms significantly increase the administrative costs of busi-
nesses and public bodies. The study found no strong
evidence that the benefits of split payment would outweigh
its costs. The main identified effects were that a wider
scope of split payment would potentially provide a larger
decrease of the VAT gap and hence have a positive impact
on the Member States’ budgets, but would also significantly
increase the related administrative costs for businesses,
especially when applied on broad scale. However, the
analysis was highly dependent on the specific design of
the policy options as well as on the assumptions that had
to be made in order to carry out the quantitative analysis.
Therefore, a different design of the mechanism for split
payment may come to considerably different results.23
As mentioned above, the split payment mechanism is
an effective means to combat missing trader fraud as
suppliers cannot disappear without paying VAT to the
tax authorities. However, fraud is still possible with cash
transactions or transactions in cryptocurrencies, such as
14 See also European Commission, Analysis of the Impact of the Split
Payment Mechanism as an Alternative VAT Collection Method, Final
Report, 20 (Dec. 2017).
15 Law 190 (Stability Law) (23 Dec. 2014); European Commission
29–30 (2017).
16 See Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/784 of 25 Apr.
2017 (OJ L 118, at 17–19 (6 May 2017)).
17 Legislative proposal of 12 May 2017 to amend the VAT Law, Later
Finance Bill 2018; R. Prätzler, Split Payment in VAT Systems – Is This
the Future?, Intl. VAT Monitor 2 (2018).
18 Ordinance no 23 of 30 Aug. 2017, published in the Official Journal
of Romania (no 706); European Commission 42 (2017).
19 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to
the Council in accordance with Art. 395 of Council Directive 2006/
112/EC, Brussels, 8 Nov. 2018, COM(2018) 666 final.
20 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Study on the feasibility of alternative
methods for improving and simplifying the collection of VAT
through the means of modern technologies and/or financial inter-
mediaries, 2010.
21 European Commission, Analysis of the impact of the split payment
mechanism as an alternative VAT collection method, Final Report,
Dec. 2017.
22 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Study on the feasibility of alternative
methods for improving and simplifying the collection of VAT
through the means of modern technologies and/or financial inter-
mediaries, 2010.
23 European Commission, Analysis of the impact of the split payment
mechanism as an alternative VAT collection method, Final Report,
Dec. 2017.
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bitcoin. If thresholds are put in place or if only transac-
tions to certain customers are in scope of the split pay-
ment mechanism fraudsters will most likely reroute their
transactions through customers not within the scope of
the split payment mechanism. To be entirely effective in
preventing VAT fraud the mechanism in the authors’
view should cover all B2B transactions, maybe even
transactions to consumers. Banks should make the split
to avoid any heavy administrative obligations on smaller
businesses or even consumers. Thresholds or application
of split payment on certain transactions may also affect
the neutrality of the system. A split payment mechanism
will increase administrative costs as often a special VAT
bank account must be opened. Furthermore, the obliga-
tion to make payments to two accounts may increase the
administrative burden of businesses. Facilitation of the
process by banks decreases the burden for businesses
but increases it for the banks.24 When the VAT is
directly paid to the tax authorities, the split payment
mechanism has a negative impact on the supplier’s cash
flow position as the input VAT can no longer be directly
offset against the output VAT. The use of special VAT
bank accounts for both output VAT and input VAT (like
the model in Poland) can solve this problem.25 This will
facilitate cash flow neutrality for both businesses and tax
authorities. A split payment mechanism is also much
easier to audit as the VAT flows are transparent.
4 BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
Blockchain is suitable as a means to record transactions
and other data. It is best known as the technology behind
the popular cryptocurrency bitcoin, but the application of
blockchain is much wider. Blockchain technology can be
used in smart contracts. Smart contracts are no real con-
tracts. It is merely a recording of agreements made in a
contract by the parties involved on the blockchain. Once
the event mentioned in the contract occurs the smart
contract will automatically implement the related effect.
For example, a seller of e-books can settle with his buyers
that if the download is completed and received, the agreed
payment for the e-book takes place automatically. Neither
of the parties in the contract will thus run the risk of non-
performance by the other party. The payment of VAT can
automatically take place via smart contracts too. This
offers possibilities for preventing VAT fraud. When the
tax authorities are part of such a smart contract, VAT can
be transferred automatically to the tax authorities instead
of being received and paid by the supplier.26 Such a
system is in fact a combination of split payment and
blockchain technology.
Other solutions using blockchain technology can also
be considered. Ainsworth and Shact27 propose to use a
system called Digital Invoice Customs Exchange (here-
inafter: DICE) (see also section 7.4).28 Within this sys-
tem, in case of cross-border transactions, the buyer,
seller and the tax authorities of both countries concerned
are aware of the transaction before a formal VAT invoice
is issued. There is time for a risk analysis.29 With the
help of artificial intelligence, transactions with a high
risk can be spotted. Suspicious transactions can be
delayed or blocked by the tax authorities. In Ainsworth
and Shact’s proposal, DICE technology is combined with
a blockchain solution in which all EU countries partici-
pate. Ainsworth and Shact admit that with their proposal
VAT fraud cannot be resolved completely, but it can be
reduced.30 In a later publication, Ainsworth, Alwohaibi
and Cheetham claim that a combination of the system
outlined above with a VAT coins system can prevent
VAT fraud altogether.31 VATcoin is a digital currency
like bitcoin. Only the government can convert
VATcoins into real money. In the VATcoin’s system
entrepreneurs do no longer own the VAT as real
money. All VATcoins are held in the ‘cloud’. According
to the authors VATcoins are not sensitive to cyberattacks.
If VATcoins are stolen, they are immediately worthless.
VATcoins may only be exchanged by the government. A
sale or purchase of VATcoins is therefore illegal. In
addition, a payment with stolen VATcoins will be
refused by the blockchain. It will be immediately clear
from where the stolen VATcoins originate. The under-
lying transaction will be refused, the stolen VATcoins
will be cancelled and an audit will be activated.32
In our opinion blockchain technology is promising in
addressing VAT fraud. It can both be used to prevent
24 See also Prätzler, supra n. 17.
25 Ibid.
26 See also Tommie van der Bosch, Dolf Diederichsen & Christoper
Demetrius, Blockchain in Global Finance and Tax, 20(1) Derivatives
& Financial Instruments (2018), para. 3.3. Compare: Deloitte,
Blockchain Technology and Its Potential in Taxes 13 (Dec. 2017). As
such the system is comparable to Real Time VAT or RTvat
described by some authors: Lubka Tzenova, The Myth of the
Neutrality of VAT, Int’l VAT Monitor 271–78 (Sept./Oct. 2014),
Richard T. Ainsworth, Technology Can Solve MTIC Fraud – VLN,
RTvat, D-VAT Certification, Int’l VAT Monitor 153–60 (May/June
2011), Charles Jennings, The EU VAT System – Time for a New
Approach?, Int’l VAT Monitor 257–59 (July/Aug. 2010) and
Christian Amand & Kris Boucquez, A New Defence for Victims of
EU Missing-Trader Fraud?, Int’l VAT Monitor 239 (July/Aug. 2011).
27 Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact, Blockchain (Distributed
Ledger Technology) Solves VAT Fraud, Boston University School of
Law, Law & Economics Working Paper No 16–41.
28 An extensive description of DICE can be found in Ainsworth &
Alwohaibi, supra n. 27, Working Paper No. 17–05.
29 See also Danil Getmantsev, Electronic VAT Administration System in
Ukraine: Comparative Analysis With the European Union, Int’l VAT
Monitor (2018), no. 5.
30 For example, a first link of VAT fraud cannot be detected if the
prices are normal and the trading volumes are not exceptionally
large, but it is possible to prevent further fraud in that specific
chain.
31 Richard T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi & Mike Cheetham, VAT
Coin: The GCC’s Cyrptotaxcurrency, Boston Univ. School of L., Law
& Economics Paper No. 17–04.
32 More on VAT and blockchain in: Madeleine Merkx, VAT and
Blockchain: Challenges and Opportunities Ahead, 2 EC Tax Rev.
83–89 (2019).
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VAT fraud or to detect VAT fraud. However there are
issues to consider. First of all using blockchain technol-
ogy requires an investment from EU Member States.
Split payment through the use of smart contracts seems
the simplest option to apply. However still many legal
question arise as regards smart contracts, such as: who
sets up these smart contracts, who checks them, are the
smart contracts publicly available and how are they
secured? Such issues need to be solved before we can
use smart contracts. The split payment and blockchain
technology combination also has an impact on cash
flows. However different than the split payment mechan-
ism on a stand-alone basis, the smart contract can pay
and refund the VAT automatically and – depending on
the necessary checks – (almost) real time. The combina-
tion of DICE and blockchain technology has clear ben-
efits but it will require a bigger investment and involves
more legal questions, such as legal protection of tax-
payers in case ‘the system’ considers the transaction a
suspicious transaction, while it is in fact not.33 VATcoin
too can contribute to the prevention and detection of
VAT fraud, but again requires a bigger investment and
more legal issues arise as regards the exchange of money
for VAT coins and vice versa. Businesses might be willing
to invest in blockchain technology together with the EU
Member States when the solution prevents them from
unintentionally getting involved in a fraudulent supply
chain or from otherwise being affected negatively by
VAT fraud (e.g. because fraudsters use lower prices
than market prices). Especially when the blockchain
solution matches other business needs, such as supply
chain management needs or trade checks, businesses
may be willing to support the technological solution
financially.
5 REAL TIME REPORTING
When talking about real time reporting within the EU
the Spanish Immediate Information System or IIS
directly comes to mind. Under the system certain busi-
nesses are required to provide information to the tax
authorities almost real time using VAT books where
invoices are registered. The deadline for submitting
invoices issued by the business is four calendar days
from the issue date (eight calendar days in case the
invoice is issued by the recipient or a third party). For
purchase invoices the deadline is four calendar days
from the date of the accounting entry. Next to IIS taxable
persons still need to file monthly self-assessment returns
and pay the VAT based on the return filed.
Italy has a mandatory e-invoicing system called Sistema
di Interscambio (SdI). This system requires taxable persons
to file electronic invoices in an XML-format with the tax
authorities for an automatic approval before the invoice is
being sent to the customer. The obligation applies to sup-
plies of goods and services between parties resident, estab-
lished or VAT registered in Italy, regardless of whether the
customer is another taxable person or a final consumer.34 In
order to implement these new rules Italy has obtained dero-
gations to deviate from the VAT Directive.35 From the
request it becomes clear that the objective of these new
rules is to acquire invoices in real time to do timely and
automatic checks of the consistency between VAT declared
and paid. This measure should bring effective results in the
fight against tax fraud due to the greater comprehensiveness,
timeliness and traceability of the information. However tax
authorities must have enough human and technical
resources to duly analyse this information. Italy submits
that before the SdI system it takes around eighteen months
for the tax authorities to become aware of the existence of a
missing trader. The SdI would allow this interval to be
reduced to up to three months according to Italy.36 The
derogation provided to Italy applies until 31 December
2021. This allows for an assessment of whether the special
measure is appropriate and effective in light of its objectives.
From the proposal it becomes clear that an assessment report
should include an evaluation of the measure on taxable
persons and in particular the increase of their administrative
burdens and compliance costs. Qualifying taxable persons
will also have to submit data on cross-border transactions
they have supplied or received from persons established
abroad. The data that needs to be reported includes: data
on the parties involved in the transaction, the date and
number of the related document, the taxable amount, the
applied VAT rate and VAT amount or the nature of the
transaction when VAT is not due. The communication of
this data is optional in case of supplies for which a customs
bill or qualifying electronic invoices have been issued.37
The SdI is comparable to the DICE system as
described by Ainsworth and Todorov. Of particular
interest is their proposal to apply DICE for international
transactions. Their proposal includes a DICE system that
is used by both origin and destination country and
consists of eight steps:
1. The seller generates a file in XML format and
digitally signs it. The file is transmitted to the tax autho-
rities in the origin country.
33 Compare: M. B. A. van Hout, Rechtsbescherming in het tijdperk van
big data (Legal protection in the era of big data), WFR 2017/165.
34 Simonette La Grutta, Italy – Budget Law for 2018 – Value Added Tax
(12 Jan. 2018) IBFD Database and Simonetta La Grutta, Italy – Law
Decree on Urgent Tax Measures – Further Details of VAT Measures
(31 Jan. 2019), IBFD Database.
35 Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/593 of 16 Apr. 2018
authorizing the Italian Republic to introduce a special measure
derogating from Arts 218 and 232 of Directive 2006/112/EC on
the common system of value added tax, OJ 2018, L 99, 14–15.
36 Proposal for a Council Implementing Decisions authorizing the
Italian Republic to introduce a special measure derogating from
Arts 218 and 232 of Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system
of value added tax, Brussels 5 Feb. 2018, COM (2018) 55 final,
p. 1 and 3.
37 Simonette La Grutta, Italy – Electronic Invoicing – Implementing Rules
Issued (30 May 2018), IBFD Database.
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2. A check is done on the XML-file for accuracy and
completeness.
3. If the file is in order the tax administration of the
origin country will send an access key to the seller and
simultaneously notifies the destination country by send-
ing it a copy of the XML file and the access key.
4. The seller will produce a pro-forma invoice that
includes relevant access codes
5. The seller transmits the pro-forma invoice to the buyer.
6. The buyer creates an XML file reproducing all
necessary contract information and digitally signs the
file. He transmits the file to the tax administration of
the destination country.
7. The tax administration of the destination country
will match the buyer’s XML file with the seller’s XML file.
If the data is correct the tax administration of the desti-
nation country will issue a second access key to the
buyer. The buyer transmits the XML file and the second
access key to the seller.
8. The seller will process an exempt intra-Community
supply to the buyer from the origin country.38
IIS is considered a clear increase of the VAT-related
compliance burden. On the other hand the taxable person
will have access to information on the website of the
Spanish tax authorities and information from third par-
ties. They are therefore able to check this information
prior to filing their monthly VAT returns. There is also a
reduction in the requests for information by the Spanish
tax authorities.39 The SdI has not been in place long
enough to say something about the increase of adminis-
trative burden. This concern has however been expressed
in the proposal. Another benefit of both systems is in the
authors’ view that transactions can be matched. With IIS a
customer can see whether a supplier has reported a trans-
action and vice versa. If a mismatched is detected, how-
ever, the transaction has already taken place and invoices
have been issued. This is different for SdI and DICE,
where transactions have to approved before taking place.
Tax authorities can do automated checks within both
systems.40 Within both systems fraudsters can still report
the transactions in the system, but fail to file their VAT
returns and disappear. Tax authorities will however more
quickly track the fraudsters and have more information
on the transactions on which they have not paid VAT. On
the other hand fraudsters have a smaller time frame to
commit the VAT fraud and therefore it will be less lucra-
tive. What’s more there is scientific evidence that if people
know they are being watched they are less likely to
commit fraud. Fraud may thus shift to other jurisdictions
that have not implemented real time reporting.41 Cash
flow is not affected by IIS.
6 SAF-T
SAF-T stands for Standard Audit File for Tax and is devel-
oped by the OECD in relation to the consequences of
globalization where businesses are confronted with a vari-
ety of accounting requirements around the world and tax
administrations have an increased need for co-operation
through exchange of information and, where necessary,
joint audits.42 SAF-T’s objective is to minimize compliance
costs for businesses and administration costs for revenue
authorities.43 It provides for tax reporting and filing stan-
dards and ensures tax audit processes can be carried out
with greater reliability.44 SAF-T is an accounting file with
data exported from the original accounting system relating
to a specific time period. It is easily readable because of the
standardization of its layout and format. It also provides for
computer-assisted audit.45 It will help auditors in testing
electronic accounting data for the purposes of identifying
risks and quantifying possible errors. This allows auditors
to target their resources more effectively at those errors
with a material impact. Depending on the way SAF-T is
designed it may also allow more detailed analysis of busi-
ness transactions, because it allows for testing transactions
down to line level.46 Because more detailed information
must be provided it may lead to an improvement of
compliance.47 It is designed to be used by multinational
enterprises as well as small and medium enterprises. Using
SAF-T does not fully discharge the taxpayer from providing
information to the tax authorities. Information not nor-
mally found in accounting system may be necessary to
determine the tax liability for VAT. SAF-T can also be
used by other parties such as private accountants.48
Management of the business can also get access to reliable
information and use this in its decision making process.49
The idea behind SAF-T is that all OECDMember States use
the same format which will minimize administrative bur-
dens for businesses. Any deviations from the SAF-T con-
cept of the OECD will place a corresponding burden on
businesses and international software developers.50
38 Richard T. Ainsworth & Goran Todorov, DICE – Digital Invoice
Customs Exchange, Boston University School of Law Working Paper
No. 13–40 (22 Aug. 2013).
39 Luis Maria Romero Flor, The New Spanish Immediate Information
Supply System, Int’l VAT Monitor 220–24 (Nov./Dec. 2018).
40 See also Isabelle Desmeytere, EU Standard VAT Return – A Real Tool
or Just ‘Nice To Have’?, Int’l VAT Monitor (Nov./Dec. 2014).
41 OECD, The Changing Tax Compliance Environment and the Role
of Audit 245 (2017).
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SAF-T has been designed to capture the following
data:
(1) General ledger
(a) Journals
(2) Accounts receivable
(a) Customer Master Files
(b) Invoices
(c) Payments
(3) Accounts payable
(a) Supplier Master Files
(b) Invoices
(c) Payments
(4) Fixed Assets
(a) Asset Master Files
(b) Depreciation & Revaluation
(5) Inventory
(a) Product Master Files
(b) Movements51
Some EU Member States have implemented SAF-T.
However, because the approach lacks harmonization
multinational enterprises are faced with different local
requirements.52 As mentioned before this reduces the
added value of SAF-T for businesses. But this applies to
tax authorities too. In case data has a different format or
scope it cannot be easily matched with data from other
jurisdictions.53 From experience it becomes clear that
many companies have serious implementation costs
such as the purchase and installation of new reporting
solutions or reviews of the systems and the quality of
data.54 On the other hand, Poland is the first EU country
that announced to abolish VAT returns because of its
mandatory SAF-T for all types of businesses. SAF-T will
also enhance voluntary compliance, because the tax
authorities have more information on the taxpayer.
There is evidence that if taxpayers believe they are
observed or if information is known they are more likely
to comply.55 SAF-T has no impact on cash flows.
The authors are however of the opinion that SAF-T
will contribute to the solution in addressing VAT fraud if
the information can be accessed (nearly) real-time and if
EU Member States operate together.56 A harmonized EU
approach will contribute to a reduction of administrative
burden for businesses and tax authorities. SAF-T origin-
ally intended to do so. However as EU Member States
failed to reach agreement on the standard VAT return
and EU Member States have already implemented SAF-T
using their own standards the authors fear that a fully
common approach is not likely.
7 CONCLUSION
It is difficult to compare technological solutions that prevent
VAT fraud to solutions that contribute to the detection of
VAT fraud. In general prevention is of course better than
curing. Where SAF-T and IIS and SdI may (in the long run)
contribute to the reduction of compliance and administra-
tive costs, blockchain and split payment require a contin-
uous investment by either businesses banks or tax
administration. Split payment as such is a VAT only solution
and therefore should not be preferred in the authors’ opi-
nion. Blockchain solutions maymatch other business needs
and businesses may be more willing to invest. Most impor-
tantly a harmonized EU approach is necessary to prevent
high compliance and administrative costs and blocking
systems implemented to communicate to each other.
A change of the current VAT system for intra EU trade
will have up and downsides compared to the current
system. The same is true for the general reverse charge
mechanism. Some of the technological solutions look
promising, but require initial investments and have recur-
ring costs. These investments should in the authors’ view
be made by businesses and governments together. In
particular the EU should perform research on the options
of blockchain technology and focus on a harmonized
SAF-T implementation. If information within SAF-T can
be accessed real time there seems no need to require real
time reporting of invoices or VAT books and VAT returns
can be abolished. According to the author’s these techno-
logical developments should be given a chance before the
new system is adopted. The effect of Transaction Network
Analysis should also be considered first. Only if these
mechanisms fail a new system should be considered.
51 Ibid., at 10.
52 Bronzewska, supra n. 47, 569 & 572. See Majdanska & Dziwinski,
supra n. 49, at 582–92 describe the state of play as regards SAF-T
in six EU Member States.
53 Majdanska & Dziwinski, supra n. 49, at 591. Compare: Amand &
Boucquez, supra n. 26, at 239.
54 Bronzewska, supra n. 47, at 572.
55 OECD, The Changing Tax Compliance Environment and the Role of
Audit, 245 (2017). See also Majdanska & Dziwinski, supra n. 49, at
585.
56 See also Majdanska & Dziwinski, supra n. 49, at 585.
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